We examine the problem of optimally allocating a fixed budget to a finite number of different investment projects. The marginal productivity of capital in a project is first increasing then decreasing with the amount of capital invested in it. When the total budget is below some lower cutoff value, the entire budget is invested in a single project. Above this cutoff, the share invested in a project can be discontinuous and non-monotone in the total budget. Ultimately, an upper cutoff is reached. Above it, all projects receive more capital as the budget increases. If the projects are identical, each will get the same budget. * We thank Edward Shpiz and Jon Lindsey for incisive and constructive comments that improved our mathematical exposition, and Nils Wernerfelt for able research assistance.
Introduction
We address a simple capital allocation problem in which an agent can implement various investment projects at different levels. In the public realm, this could be a federal agency that has to determine a vaccination strategy for a contagious disease, such as avian flu, with a limited national vaccination budget. Given that herd immunity develops, it is well known that the social benefits curve from a vaccination campaign is S-shaped in the proportion of the vaccination inoculated in a locale. A similar problem arises if a very limited amount of a drug is to be distributed to reduce new infections in a nation heavily afflicted with HIV. An egalitarian allocation might have little beneficial effect.
Our general model also applies to a range of private-sector allocation problems. Thus, a credit-rationed entrepreneur may have the potential to invest in various independent projects, each of which offers increasing and then decreasing returns to invested capital. Much R&D investment has this character, as do efforts to market a new product in different areas.
The central ingredient of the general model is that the marginal benefit of each possible action is hump-shaped, i.e. the marginal benefit of an action is maximum at some intermediate intensity of that action. The objective function, which is the sum of the benefits extracted from the different actions, is therefore not concave in the vector of decision variables. In fact, under this assumption, it is tempting to give up the idea to distribute resources to all projects, because of the low productivity from projects funded at a modest scale.
The question of increasing returns in an economy has been widely studied, in a theoretical framework, notably in the seventies. Indeed, with increasing returns, a competitive market may lack an equilibrium. Many authors proposed solutions to avoid this problem (see for instance Rader [10] , Aoki [1] , Cremer [4] , Brown and Heal [2] or Heal [6] ). But here the issue is not approached in this way. Another branch of the literature that is more closely related to our topic concerns the analysis of the financing of R&D projects. Weitzman [13] considered the case where there are a finite number of different opportunities, each yielding an unknown reward. He proposed an algorithm that tells at each stage whether or not to continue searching and if so, which project to finance. This could apply to the optimal sequential search strategy for developing various uncertain technologies that meet the same or similar purpose. This model has been extended by Roberts and Weitzman [11] in a more general framework. Our analysis approaches to this one expect that the benefit function generated by each project is assumed to be known in our case. Section 2 motivates the paper by giving examples where the benefit function is S-shaped. Section 3 analyzes the problem when the investor faces an infinite number of identical projects. In section 4, we state some general properties in the case of a low budget level. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of higher budget levels in the case of identical benefit functions. Section 6 tackles the case of heterogeneous benefit functions associated to a high budget level and section 7 concludes.
S-Shaped Productivity in Various Domains
This section argues that a total productivity curve that is S-shaped is found across a broad array of areas. The shape usually arises because two conflicting forces are at work: (1) Small investments accomplish little. Thus, $100,000 will not produce a sophisticated new invention, nor dent the national consciousness in a media campaign for a new product. (2) Beyond a certain level of investment decreasing returns set in. Thus, the invention is likely to have been developed if it will ever be developed at affordable cost, and the product will likely be widely known. Hence, productivity first rises with expenditure at an increasing rate, and then the rate decreases. The S-shape emerges, as is shown in Figure 1 .
The concept of herd immunity is well known in epidemiology. Each individual who gets immunized against a communicable disease within a closed population conveys a positive externality. Since he can no longer get the dis-ease, he can no longer communicate it to others. The first few immunizations yield little external benefit, since there remain so many other individuals who can still convey infection. However, once a significant proportion of individuals has been vaccinated, the whole population is substantially protected, which leads to the label herd immunity. Beyond a certain point, additional vaccinations therefore yield little additional protection (see for instance Fine [5] ).
Efforts to produce inventions have long been recognized to exhibit an Sshaped in the function relating probability of success to level of investment. Such a shape is clearly delineated in the empirical analysis of patenting as a function of R&D expenditures by a firm in Scherer [9] Figure 1 . S-shaped curves product performance are a driving concept behind Utterback's [12] (pp. 158-160) analysis of radical innovations, and Christensen's [3] ( pp. 39-41)) model of disruptive technologies. Successor (radical or disruptive) technologies come along when the first technology is operating beyond its inflection point. Kuznets [7] (pp. 31-33) noted the same S-shape phenomenon for an industry as a whole, which might be relevant say for government R&D and tax policies that seeks to push various industries forward.
Little [8] provides an overview look at the returns to aggregate advertising of various products, drawing on the work of others. He identifies S-shaped responses, e.g., of sales/capita in response to advertising/capita, though he also alerts readers to more complex patterns. He concludes (p. 639) "that advertising models should accommodate S-shaped curves."
In general, in any investment arena where there is a range of increasing returns, we should expect to find S-shaped response curves. That is because we know that decreasing returns set in, since except where natural resources are involved, we do not see one product, or one firm, or one industry dominating a major economy. When two or more entities must compete for investment, and where those entities each experience S-shaped returns, the lessons of this paper apply.
Benchmark: a continuous-choice model
We first examine a simple model with an infinite number of projects. Projects are indexed by t, which can take any value between 0 and 1. If a budget x∆t ≥ 0 is invested in projects in [t, t + ∆t], a benefit b(x)∆t is obtained by the investor on this project. We assume that b(0) = 0, and that function b is increasing in its argument. Finally, we assume, as shown in Figure 1 that there exists a critical investment level w 0 such that function b is locally convex in [0, w 0 [, and that it is locally concave in ]w 0 , +∞[. The investor is endowed with a budget w to finance these projects. A budget allocation is described by a function x from [0, 1] to R + , where x(t) is the intensity of the investment in project indexed t ∈ [0, 1]. The choice problem can be written as
subject to
The objective function in (1) is the aggregate benefit generated by the budget allocation x(.), whereas constraint (2) states that the aggregate budget devoted to the set of projects equals w (there will be equality, since marginal productivity never turns negative for a project). The intensity of the investment in each project is constrained to be nonnegative. B(w) is the maximal aggregate benefit that can be obtained from budget w. The optimal budget allocation, which is the solution of the above program, is denoted x * (.). The solution of this problem is simple and, we believe, well-known. It is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let w 1 ≥ w 0 be the intensity of investment that maximizes the average benefit b(x)/x. Two cases must be considered.
1. w ≤ w 1 : In that case, it is optimal to invest x = w 1 in a proportion p = w/w 1 of the projects. The other projects are not implemented at all.
2. w > w 1 : In that case, it is optimal to invest x = w in all projects.
Proof: See the Appendix ¥ This proposition states that the optimal budget allocation depends upon whether the available budget is smaller or larger than a critical value w 1 . This critical value is the investment intensity that maximizes the benefit b per dollar invested:
. When the available budget is smaller than w 1 , it is optimal to select a proportion p = w/w 1 of the projects in which the investor invests a fixed amount x = w 1 in them. All other projects are abandoned (x = 0). Which projects are selected is irrelevant, since all projects are assumed to have the same benefit function in this section. When the available budget is relatively abundant, i.e., when w is larger than w 1 , it is optimal to implement the egalitarian strategy, because of the concavity of the benefit function in this region.
The aggregate benefit function B is therefore the concave envelope of the projects-specific function b
Randomizing the allocation of resources concavifies the benefit function. Let us now turn to the case where there is a finite number of projects, identical or not, that is available to the investor.
Low budget levels: general case
In the case of a finite number of benefit functions b 1 ,..., b n , it is much more complex to solve the investor's problem that reads
subject to x i ≥ 0 ∀i = 1...n − 1, P n−1 i=1 x i ≤ w. However, when the budget level is low, the following lemma describes the optimal allocation. Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that w * 1 = min i w * i and that w ≤ w * 1 . Suppose moreover that x 1 , ..., x n belong to E = {x i ≥ 0 | x 1 + ...x n = w} and that j is such that
These n inequalities lead to
Because this is true for all x i in E, the above inequality means that any allocation (x 1 , ..., x n ) is dominated by an allocation in which the entire budget is allocated to one project.¥ As in the continuous case, when the total budget is less than min i w * i , it is optimal to invest the entire budget in the project with the highest benefit function because of the increasing returns to scale at low intensities. In the case where the n benefit functions are the same, the thresholds w * i are the same and will be denoted w 1 . In this case, when the budget level is less than w 1 , it is optimal to invest it entirely in one of the projects. But contrary to the continuous case, the determination of the optimal allocation is quite difficult in this alternative model with n heterogeneous projects. In particular, it need not be optimal to finance an increasing number of projects when the total budget is larger. The following parts will be devoted to the study of the optimal allocation in the case of higher budget levels. We are going to solve this problem in two steps, focusing first on the case of identical benefit functions, and studying then heterogeneous benefit functions.
When the budget level increases: the case of identical benefit functions
To have an intuition of the results, we first analyze the case of two identical benefit functions. We then extend the results to a finite number of benefit functions using induction arguments.
Two identical projects

General properties
If x and w −x denote the budget invested in each project, the choice problem is
There exist three types of solutions to this maximization program as the following proposition tells us.
Proposition 2
The optimal solution of problem (4) belongs to one of the following three types 1. the full-specialization type x * ∈ {0, w}, 2. the symmetric -or egalitarian-type x * = w/2,
Notice that program (4) is symmetric relative to w/2. Therefore, in the rest of our discussion of the 2 identical-projects case, we are going to focus on solutions that are greater or equal to w/2. The full-specialization solution will designate w, the equal solution w/2 and the asymmetric interior solution w − b
x (w). In the case of the full-specialization solution, the entire budget is devoted to only one project. In the case of the symmetric solution, both projects get exactly the same amount, and in the case of the asymmetric interior solution, the two projects get a different positive amount.
According to Lemma 1, when w is less than w 1 , all the budget is devoted to a unique project. The following lemmas give first properties of the solution for higher budget levels.
Lemma 2
The symmetric solution is a local minimum if w < 2w 0 .
Proof: The second-order derivative of the objective function of program (4) with respect to the decision variable equals 2b 00 (w/2) when evaluated at x = w/2. By assumption, this is positive since w/2 is smaller than w 0 . ¥ The intuition is again based on the assumption that the marginal benefit of individual projects is increasing for small investment levels. In particular, when the total budget is less than 2w 0 , the symmetric solution x = w − x = w/2 lies in the range of increasing marginal benefits. In that case, a marginal deviation from the equal allocation raises the total benefit. Thus the diversified allocation cannot be optimal when the total budget is smaller than 2w 0 . Only the specialized solution or the interior solution is possible for this range of the total budget.
In the next lemma, we determine the condition under which the specialized solution dominates the diversified one.
Lemma 3 There exists a single w 2 ∈ R ∪ {+∞} such that b (w) ≥ 2b (w/2) for all w ≤ w 2 and b(w) ≤ 2b(w/2) for all w > w 2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.¥ In words, w 2 is the unique critical wealth level below which full-specialization dominates the symmetric solution, and above which the symmetric allocation is preferred to full-specialization. This implies that, when the budget is increased, it is never optimal to switch from the diversified solution to the specialized one. The following proposition provides more insights about how the optimal strategy evolves as the budget level w is increased.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of two identical projects. The optimal investment strategy has the following characteristics:
1. For low budget levels, the full-specialization strategy is optimal; 2. Then, as the total budget level w increases, the optimal strategy can switch to an asymmetric interior solution, or directly to the symmetric allocation ;
3. Once the symmetric allocation is selected, it remains optimal for all larger w.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥ According to Proposition 3, once a strategy (an asymmetric interior solution or the equal strategy) dominates the full-specialization strategy for a given budget level w, the full-specialization strategy will not be optimal for any budget level that is higher than w. Moreover, if the symmetric strategy is optimal for a given budget level, it will remain optimal for any higher budget levels. How can we intuitively explain the results of Proposition 3? When the budget level is low, the investor prefers to favour one project by investing the whole budget in it because of the low productivity at low budget levels. On the contrary, when the total budget level is high enough, the investor prefers to share the budget equally between both projects because of the projects' decreasing productivity from w 0 on. In between, the investor wants to invest a strictly positive amount in each project but he still favours one project to the detriment of the other. It is not worth to invest everything in a single project since, from the inflection point on, marginal benefit of investing in a project is decreasing. However, the investor prefers to take advantage of the high productivity for one project and a lower productivity for the other.
To illustrate Proposition 3, we consider an example where the benefit function is given by
with γ = 2 and k = 2. Observe that w 0 = 0.613 and w 1 = 0.816 in this numerical example. We have drawn the optimal strategy as a function of the total budget w in Figure 2 . When w is smaller than 1, it is optimal to invest everything in one project. When w is between 1 and 1.225, the asymmetric interior solution is optimal. Finally, for larger w, the symmetric strategy is optimal. Concerning asymmetric interior solutions, let us observe that, as wealth w increases, one of the two projects will get a smaller budget, as seen in 
is negative, which implies that db x/dw and d(w − b x)/dw must have opposite signs. To get more information on the evolution of the solution to the maximization program (4) when the total budget level increases, we hereafter study three particular classes of functions: symmetric benefit functions, benefit functions that are "pulled down", and benefit functions that are "lifted up".
Symmetric Benefit Functions
A symmetric benefit function can be seen as either having symmetric first order derivatives with respect to the inflection point w 0 , or as a 180
• rotated function from the part below w 0 to the part above w 0 . In this case, the marginal benefit function is symmetric relative to the axis w = w 0 . With such a benefit function, any asymmetric interior allocation b
x is excluded and the unique switching wealth level w 2 equals 2w 0 , as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that b
0 is symmetric in the sense that b
. Then, the fully specialized strategy is optimal if w is smaller than 2w 0 , whereas the symmetric strategy is optimal if w is larger than 2w 0 .
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥ When the benefit function is symmetric, the optimal strategy is fullspecialization when w ≤ 2w 0 , and is egalitarian otherwise. In other words, for any budget w below 2w 0 , one project gets all the budget w, otherwise the two projects get exactly the same amount w/2. This special case serves as a benchmark for the next two cases, where the benefit function is not symmetric.
The analysis is simplest if it is conducted using the marginal benefit function. We consider two cases. In the first, beyond the inflection point both the total and marginal functions lie below their equivalent function for the hypothetical symmetric case 2 . We refer to this as having the benefit functions (both total and marginal) "pulled down". In the second case, both the total and marginal benefit functions lie above their symmetric counterparts. We call this the "lifted up" case.
"Pulled Down" (PD) Benefit Functions
Let us first give the definition of a benefit function that is stretched to the left. If a benefit function is PD, beyond the inflection point w 0 the marginal benefit curve is pulled to the left so that it lies everywhere below the symmetric case curve. In Figure 3 , the marginal benefit function in the PD case is represented.
Given PD, once the maximal productivity b 0 (w 0 ) has been reached, the increase in productivity is less than in the symmetric case. The following lemma allows us to check that w 2 is smaller than 2w 0 . This is useful since it implies that for all budget levels larger than 2w 0 , the symmetric strategy dominates the fully specialized one.
Lemma 4
Suppose that the benefit function b is PD. Then, w 2 < 2w 0 .
Proof: We are going to prove that b (2w 0 ) < 2b (w 0 ).
Therefore, b (2w 0 ) < 2b (w 0 ) and w 2 < 2w 0 .¥ In the next proposition, we show that, when w > 2w 0 , the egalitarian strategy is the optimal one, i.e., no asymmetric allocation is superior.
Proposition 5
Suppose that the benefit function b is PD. Then, the symmetric strategy is optimal whenever w > 2w 0 . Proof: See the Appendix. ¥ When the benefit function is PD and the budget level is larger than 2w 0 , it is optimal to share equally the budget between the two projects. Remember that we obtained the same result in the symmetric case. Because the increase in productivity from w 0 on is less rapid than in the symmetric case, the attractiveness of the specialized solution is weakened. Since it was already inferior to the egalitarian solution in the symmetric case, this result is reinforced in the PD case.
As an illustration, we focus on a family of functions of the form
If α = 0, b is a symmetric function with respect to w 0 . If α is negative, function b is PD, and if α is positive, function b is lifted up. In Figure 4 , we take α to be equal to −0.1. In this case, w 0 = 0.474 and w 2 = 0.921 < 2w 0 .
For w > 2w 0 = 0.948, the symmetric allocation is optimal as we see on the graph. An asymmetric interior solution exists when w ≤ 2w 0 .
"Lifted Up" (LU) Benefit Functions
A second important case arises when both the total and marginal benefit functions are "lifted up", so they lie above their hypothetical symmetric functions. We define this term more formally as 
If a benefit function is LU, beyond the inflection point w 0 the marginal benefit curve is pulled to the right so that it lies everywhere above the symmetric case curve. Therefore, the increase in productivity is more rapid than in the symmetric case beyond w 0 . Intuitively, this reinforces the attractiveness of the more specialized strategies. In other words, it should be more likely that one project has a greater share of the total budget than the other even when w > 2w 0 . This contrasts with the case where the benefit function is PD and where as soon as 2w 0 is reached, both projects get the same amount. Note also that if a benefit function is LU, it cannot be PD, therefore LU and PD are mutually exclusive. However, these two notions are not mutually inclusive since a benefit function might be neither PD nor LU. In the next lemma, we give the ranking of w 2 with respect to 2w 0 for a LU benefit function.
Lemma 5 Suppose that the benefit function b is LU. Then w 2 > 2w 0 .
Proof: We are going to prove that b (2w 0 ) > 2b (w 0 ).
In fact, for each δ, there exists a w (δ) such that x (δ) = w (δ) − (w 0 − δ) and w 0 − δ is an asymmetric interior solution. We are interested in the quantity z (δ) = x (δ)−(w 0 + δ) (see Figure  6 ). It corresponds to the horizontal distance between both curves. As b is LU, we know that z (δ) ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [0, w 0 ]. A condition on this function z (.) allows us to characterize the shape of the optimal solution in the case of a LU benefit function.
Proposition 6
Suppose that the benefit function b is LU.
1. If w ≤ 2w 0 , then the full-specialization strategy is optimal.
2. If w > 2w 0 and if δ 7 −→ z (δ) is increasing, then the optimal strategy cannot be an asymmetric interior one.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥ We see that, in the LU case, the egalitarian strategy will not in general be optimal even when w > 2w 0 . If function z is increasing, we have a complete characterization of the solution: it employs the full-specialization strategy for w ≤ w 2 and then switches to the equal-allocation strategy for w > w 2 . Because w 2 > 2w 0 , even when the total budget is higher than 2w 0 , it is still optimal to favour one project. This is due to the more rapid increase in the productivity beyond w 0 relative to the symmetric case. Given that z is an increasing function, the marginal productivity decreases less rapidly than in the symmetric case. A LU benefit function is thus all the more attractive. Thanks to this condition, an interior allocation satisfying the first order condition is a local minimum and should therefore not be taken into account for the search of the optimal solution (the second order condition is not satisfied). If the condition stated in Proposition 6 is not satisfied, the asymmetric solution may be a local maximum. Therefore, the optimal strategy may be to begin with the full-specialization strategy when w is very low, and as w increases to switch successively to an asymmetric interior solution and then to the equal-allocation strategy. To illustrate this case, we consider the example of the previous paragraph with a positive α, which implies that the benefit function is LU. In this case, the optimal allocation belongs to {w, w/2} according to the ranking of w with respect to w 2 (if it exists). For this numerical example, we take α to be equal to 0.2. The marginal benefit function of each project is represented on Figure 6 together with function z (.).
Since function z (.) is increasing, no asymmetric interior solution will be adopted. In this case, w 0 = 0.545 and w 2 = 1.157. The full-specialization strategy is optimal for w ≤ 1.157 and the equal strategy is optimal for w > 1.157 as we can see on Figure 7 .
In order to understand the importance of the condition we imposed on function z, we construct an example of a LU benefit function for which function z is first increasing and then decreasing 3 . We start with the symmetric benefit function b
and then construct the required function b from it: The numerical resolution of this example shows that there is a range of budget levels such that an asymmetric interior solution is optimal. If the condition on function z is not satisfied, an asymmetric interior solution may be a local maximum. Therefore, as this example shows us, there may exist a range of w for which the maximum of the sum of the two benefit functions is achieved for an asymmetric interior solution.
This family of functions helps us to characterize more precisely the shape of the solution and to give conditions under which the optimal strategy is readily characterized. We extend these results to the case of a finite number of identical benefit functions in the next section.
n identical projects
As already stated in section 3, with n projects, the investor has to solve the maximization program B (w) = max
It is convenient to maximize this benefit function in two steps.
is equivalent to finding the optimal allocation between n − 1 projects when the total budget level that is available is equal to w−x n−1 . The solutions to this maximization are denoted x * 1 (x n−1 , w) , ..., x * n−2 (x n−1 , w) . 2. Then, there remains to solve
Therefore, this kind of problem has to be solved using induction arguments. This is the methodology we are going to use differentiating the cases depending on the shape of the benefit functions. Before doing this, let us first introduce the thresholds w 2 , ..., w i , ..., w n defined by
Note that we recover the definition of w 2 . In the following lemma, we prove the uniqueness of these thresholds, and we rank them.
Lemma 6
The thresholds w 2 , ..., w n are uniquely defined by equation (8) and satisfy w 0 < w 2 < ... < w i < ... < w n .
Moreover, ∀i = 2, ...n − 1,
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥ If you only consider equal allocations among the financed projects, Lemma 6 tells us that as the total budget w increases, it is optimal to share it equally between an increasing number of projects (1, then 2, to finally end up with the financing of all n projects).
The Case of a Symmetric Benefit Function
In the case of a symmetric benefit function, the optimal allocation is quite natural as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose b is a symmetric benefit function. Then, the optimal strategy is to share equally the budget between all financed projects. Moreover,
• If w < w 2 , only one project gets the entire budget w;
• If w ≥ w n , then all the n projects are financed.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥ We have generalized the result of the previous section with two identical benefit functions. As wealth increases, the optimal strategy is to share equally the total amount between an increasing number of projects. In this section, we consider homogenous benefit functions; therefore which projects among the n are selected is not relevant. It is interesting to note that the total number of projects available to the investor does not modify the thresholds w i . Indeed, the switching point between the financing of i projects and (i + 1) projects is independent of n. Therefore, the financing of the first n projects is only modified once the last project begins to be financed since up this point, the allocation each project gets is . We now turn to the study of other families of functions.
The Case of a LU Benefit Function
It is difficult to extend the results concerning PD benefit functions in the case of n different projects. Indeed, recall that in the two projects case, we did not find a condition under which no asymmetric interior solution exists. Therefore, in this study of the n projects case, we generalize the 2 projects case we focus on to the case of pulled down benefit functions.
Proposition 8 Suppose b is a LU benefit function and δ 7 → z (δ) is an increasing function. Then, the optimal strategy is to share equally the budget between all financed projects. Moreover,
• ∀w ∈ [w i , w i+1 [, i projects are financed ∀i = 2...n − 1;
• If w ≥ w n , then all the n projects are financed. Proof: See the Appendix.¥ If the benefit function is LU, the decrease in productivity for wealth levels higher or equal than w 0 is less rapid than in the symmetric case. Therefore, it is optimal to increase the number of financed projects as the total budget w increases and to share it equally between all financed projects. We present the result in the case of a LU benefit function and of 3 projects on Figure 10 for the functions' family studied in the previous section
In this part, we managed to give the shape of the optimal allocation when the budget level increases in the case of a finite number of identical benefit functions. Now, we determine how these results generalize to the case of heterogeneous benefit functions.
6 When the budget level increases: the case of heterogeneous benefit functions
We consider the situation when the budget level is higher than min i w * i in the case of heterogeneous benefit functions. Heterogeneity makes the problem much trickier. We begin this analysis with the study of an example of three heterogeneous benefit functions.
Example
The three benefit functions we study are
The investor's program is then
The total benefit functions are represented in Figure 11 . Benefit functions b 1 (x) and b 2 (x) are LU. It is therefore possible to state the investor's problem (9) in two steps, maximizing it first with respect to y.
The solution to this maximization with two identical LU benefit functions is known and is equal to This leads to the second step
1. y * (x, w) = w − x: in this case, the investor's program (10) reduces to
This program does not accept any interior solution since the first derivatives of functions b 1 and b 3 never coincide. Therefore, the solutions are the corner solutions {0, w}. As b 1 (x) > b 3 (x) ∀x ∈ ]50, 80[, the solution is
: in this case, investor's program (10) reduces to
Combining the two solutions and comparing the three functions b 1 (x), 2b 1 (x/2) and b 3 (x) gives the solution to (9) . (Recall that x (w) is the amount invested in project 1, w − x (w) − y (w) the one in project 2 and y (w) the one in project 3.):
• If w ≤ 50, then x (w) = w − x (w) − y (w) = 0 and y (w) = w,
• If 50 < w ≤ 80, then x (w) = 0, w − x (w) − y (w) = w and y (w) = 0 (which from project 1 or project 2 gets the financing is irrelevant here since the have both the same benefit function),
• If 80 < w < 110, then x (w) = w − x (w) − y (w) = 0 and y (w) = w,
• If w ≥ 110, then x (w) = w − x (w) − y (w) = w/2 and y (w) = 0.
The solution is depicted on Figure 12 . The figure shows the counterintuitive nature of the results as w increases. Thus, project 3 begins with financing, loses financing, then regains financing, and then loses it once again. When it is financed, it gets the total budget. Project 1 is only financed when the budget w is high enough. Project 2 is successively not financed, financed, not financed to finally end up being financing but contrary to project 3, when it is financed, it is not always the case that it gets the whole financing. Let us try to recover some features of this example in a more general setting. 
General Case
We consider two heterogeneous projects; the second operates at a much larger scale than the first one. Their benefit functions are b (x) and c (x) = kb (x/j) with 1 < k < j.
( 1 1 ) They are represented on Figure 13 .
and ∀x ≤ w * 1 , b (x) > c (x). According to Lemma 1, if the total budget level w is less than w * 1 , then project b gets the entire budget w and project c gets nothing. Indeed, for low budget levels, project b is more profitable than project c and gets the entire financing. Before going further into the study of the optimal allocation, we describe the potential solutions to the investor's maximization program
Proposition 9 Suppose b is a benefit function and c (x) = kb (x/j) with 1 < k < j. The optimal solution of program (12) belongs to one of the following five types:
1. x (w) = 0 : the whole budget goes to project b, 2. x (w) = w : the whole budget goes to project c,
This solution will be called "interior solution 1", with respect to w leads to
and (13)
The ranking of (12) , project c gets an increasing amount of the total budget whereas project b gets a decreasing amount of the total budget. This result is similar than in the case of homogenous benefit function. Quite the opposite happens with the interior solution 3: project b gets an increasing amount of the total budget whereas project c gets a decreasing amount of the total budget. This is not the case anymore with the interior solution 1, where the two optimal solutions are increasing functions of the total budget w: as the budget increases, each project gets more financing. The following proposition 4 characterizes the optimal allocation.
Proposition 10 Suppose b is a LU benefit function, b 0 is concave, δ 7 → z (δ) is increasing and c (x) = kb (x/j) with 1 < k < j. The optimal solution to the maximization program (12) has the following characteristics:
1. When x ≤ w * 1 , project b gets the whole budget, 2. When interior solution 1, b x 1 (w), is the optimal allocation, it will remain so for any higher budget level.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥ The path of the optimal allocation between the two projects as a function of the budget is quite different from the case where the benefit functions were identical. No general result indeed holds on the way the different allocations link together. However, there are two similarities. First, when the budget level is very low, only one project, project b, is financed. Second, once the interior solution 1 is reached, the funding of each project increases with w. But contrary to the identical benefit functions case, the two projects are not financed at the same level. Between the allocation that gives all the budget to project b and the interior solution 1, anything may happen. In particular, each project can have an allocation that is an increasing function of the total budget whereas the allocation of the other project is a decreasing function of the total budget (interior solutions 2 and 3). Moreover, it can be the case that one project stops being financed (when project c gets all the budget). It can also happen that the three allocations mix together. In order to illustrate this discussion, we consider the family of benefit function studied in section 3
with α = 0.05, k = 1.8 and j = 2. With these parameters, the inflection point, w 0 , is equal to 0.5122, and w * 1 = 0.7478. The numerical resolution of this example gives the following results (that are depicted on Figure 14 ):
• If w < 1.1306, then project b gets the entire budget,
• If 1.1306 < w < 1.2407, then the optimal solution is the interior solution 2. The two projects are financed, but as w increases, project b is less financed whereas project c is more financed,
• If 1.2407 < w < 1.6296, then project c gets the whole budget w,
• If 1.6296 < w < 1.7073, the interior solution 2 is once again the optimal solution,
• If w > 1.7073, the interior solution 1 is optimal, meaning that the funding of each project increases with w.
When the budget level is low, only project b gets financing. But as soon as the budget level w increases and once the inflexion point is crossed, it becomes less profitable whereas project c still presents an increasing marginal productivity. Therefore, project c begins to be funded and project b gets a lower share of the total budget before being totally abandoned. There is a Once the last threshold 1.7073 is crossed, both projects get an increasing funding as w gets larger. Indeed, the two marginal productivities, while decreasing, converge and the two projects are worth being financed with a strictly positive budget share. The optimal allocation is thus much more complex than in the homogenous case; indeed the financing of each project may not be monotone with the budget level w. It is difficult to get a more precise description of the optimal allocation, but the main result is that after a succession of financing and non-financing of the different projects, they both end up being financed in an increasing way as the total funding increases.
Conclusion
We study the investment decision of an investor with multiple available projects, each presenting a range of increasing returns. Such decisions are common across a great range of fields, such as allocating R&D investment, advertising budgets, or inoculations for communicable diseases. With n identical projects, for low budget levels, the investor favours one project by investing the whole budget in it. As soon as he decides to invest a strictly positive amount in each project for a given budget level, he will keep on investing strictly positive amounts in each project. The properties of the optimal allocation are most easily seen with just two projects. As the budget increases, allocations may be unequal though positive, and a project may actually experience a reduction in budget over some range. When the total budget level is high enough, the investor shares equally the budget between the two projects and this equal strategy remains optimal for any higher budget level. When the benefit function has a plausible shape, what we label lifted up, the optimal investment strategy goes from full specialization to equal division without passing through a range with positive but unequal division. These results extend immediately to the case of a finite number of projects.
Matters are more complex when the benefit for the projects may differ. Qualitatively, however, the same local and global marginal efficiency requirements must be satisfied, and the prime features of efficient allocations are maintained. Thus, first one project gets all resources. Then there is a range where multiple projects get funding, and the funding for some way be non-monotonic with the total budget. Finally, when the budget is large, all projects get funded, and the funding for each increases as the budget grows further. In short, an apparently straightforward resource allocation problem turns out to have an intriguingly complex solution, despite perfectly intuitive efficiency conditions.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (2). The first-order condition of program (1) reads
for all t such that x(t) > 0. The second-order condition is written as b 00 (x(t)) ≤ 0. By construction, there can be at most one x that satisfies these two conditions. Therefore, all projects that are going to be financed will get the same budget x. Let p denote the proportion of projects that will be financed. The program can be written
pb (x) ,
By construction, b(x)/x is single-peaked at some x = w 1 . Two cases must be examined when solving this maximization program. The first case prevails when w is smaller or equal than w 1 . In that case, the solution to program (15) is x = w 1 (and the proportion p = w/w 1 of financed projects is less than one). Otherwise, the optimal solution is the corner solution x = w and p = 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
If we denote by λ the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint x ≤ w, the Lagrangian of program (4) reads:
Therefore, the first order condition of this program, ∂L/∂x = 0, leads to:
So, if λ > 0, the constraint binds and x = w is the solution of the program.
On the contrary, if
This solution has two possible solutions: either x * = w/2 or x * = b x. Because of the properties of the benefit function (b 0 is increasing if x ≤ w 0 and b 0 is decreasing if x ≥ w 0 ), this last possibility is possible iff b
x < w 0 < w − b x. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that w 0 < x * < w − x * . Then, consider an alternative allocation (x * + ε, w − x * − ε) with 0 < ε < (w − 2x * )/2. Because b is locally concave above w 0 , it implies that
This is a contradiction.¥
C Proof of Lemma 3
We study function
The local convexity of the function b on the interval [0, w 0 ] implies that f 0 (x) ≥ 0 for all x < w 0 . In the same way, the local concavity of b for x > w 0 , implies that f 0 (x) ≤ 0 ∀x > 2w 0 . We hereafter show that there exists a unique a such that f 0 (x) = 0. Suppose by contradiction that there exist a 1 and a 2 ,
Note that b 0 (a i /2) = b 0 (a i ) is possible only if a i /2 < w 0 < a i . Thus, we must have that w 0 < a 1 < a 2 , which implies in turn that b 0 (a 1 ) > b 0 (a 2 ). Similarly, we must have that a 1 /2 < a 2 /2 < w 0 , which implies that b 0 (a 1 /2) < b 0 (a 2 /2). Combining this last result with the initial assumption that
, a contradiction. It follows that there exists a unique a such that 
D Proof of Proposition 3
We are going to show the following three assertions:
1. As w increases, one can never switch from the fully diversified solution to the full-specialization one.
2. As w increases, one can never switch from an asymmetric interior solution to the full-specialization one.
3. As w increases, one can never switch from the fully diversified solution to an asymmetric interior one.
The first property is a direct consequence of Lemma 3. Now, we prove the second result. Consider a range of w for which an asymmetric interior solution (b x, w−b x) exists, where b
x(w) is defined by the asymmetric solution to
We know from Proposition 2 that b x < w 0 < w−b x. Let us study the function
. Consider any solution w = w of equation g(w) = 0. We show that this implies that g 0 (w) be nonpositive. Indeed, by the envelope theorem, we have that
.
It implies that if one switches between the fully specialized solution and the asymmetric interior solution when wealth increases, it can only be from the former to the latter. x(w)) − 2b(w/2). Consider any solution w = w of equation h(w) = 0. We show that this implies that h 0 (w) be nonpositive. Indeed, by the envelope theorem, we have that
We know from Proposition 2 that b x < w 0 < w − b x. We also know that b 
E Proof of Proposition 4
We first prove that the first-order condition b 0 (x) = b 0 (w − x) may have only one root at x = w/2 when w 6 = 2w 0 . Suppose by contradiction that there
. By symmetry, this can be true only if b
The first case is equivalent to b x = w/2, a contradiction. The second case is equivalent to w = 2w 0 , also a contradiction. Thus, x = w/2 is the only candidate for an interior optimum.
We then show that x = w/2 is a minimum of the objective function when w is smaller than 2w 0 . To show this, we prove that b 0 (x) ≤ b 0 (w − x) for all x smaller than w/2. Two case must be considered depending upon whether w − x is smaller or larger than w 0 . When w − x < w 0 , both x and w − x are smaller than w 0 . Because b 0 is increasing in this range, we indeed obtain A parallel proof can be written when w is larger than 2w 0 .¥
F Proof of the Proposition 5
Suppose b is PD and there exist w and b
As b 0 is decreasing for x ≥ x 0, the above equality thus implies that w − ³ w 0 − b δ´≤ w 0 + b δ, hence w ≤ 2w 0 . Therefore, if w and b
x exist, we must have that w ≤ 2w 0 . Thus, if w > 2w 0 , no interior asymmetric interior solution exists and the solution belongs to {w, w/2}. But we know that for a PD benefit function 2w 0 > w 2 . Therefore, if w > 2w 0 , 2b (w/2) > b (w) and the allocation {w/2} is the solution for w > 2w 0 . ¥
G Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose b is LU and there exist w and b
As b 0 is decreasing for x ≥ x 0, the above equality thus implies that w − (w 0 − δ) ≥ w 0 + δ, hence w ≥ 2w 0 . Therefore, if w and b
x exist, we must have that w ≥ 2w 0 . Thus, if w ≤ 2w 0 , no interior asymmetric interior solution exists and the solution belongs to {w, w/2}. However, in this case, w/2 is a local minimum Therefore, if w ≤ 2w 0 , the solution is the full-specialization strategy {0, w}.
We now focus on the case where w > 2w 0 , as b
) with respect to δ and recalling that b
) ≥ 0 and the asymmetric interior solution is a local minimum and is not a potential candidate for the optimal allocation. The solution to (4) belongs thus to {w, w/2}.¥
H Proof of Lemma 6
We are going to prove this lemma in three steps. First, since b is a convex function on [0,
b (w 0 ), meaning that w 0 < w 2 . Concerning the uniqueness of the thresholds defined by equation (8), let us consider function 
, and Now, we prove that w i < w i+1 , ∀i = 2...n − 1. According to equation (8),
¢ , or by dividing each member by x,
We have already proved that function x 7 → b (x) /x is single peaked, increasing on [0, w 1 ] and then decreasing on
¢ to hold, it must be the case that
< w 1 and
To compare w i and w i+1 , let us compute ib
I Proof of Proposition 7
We are going to prove this result using an induction argument. First with two benefit functions, we know according to Proposition 4 that when w < w 2 , then the optimal allocation is x * (w) = {w, 0} and when w ≥ w 2 , then the optimal allocation is x * (w) = {w/2, w/2}. Now, we suppose that the result holds when the investor has the choice between n − 1 projects. Let us prove that it holds when the investor has n projects. According to the previous discussion, we maximize the investor's program in two steps. First, we solve
As the result holds when the investor has the choice between n−1 projects, the solution to this program is known.
There remains to solve the second step. Suppose that w i < w − x n−1 ≤ w i+1 . Therefore, the maximization comes down to
The first order conditions, b 0 (x n−1 ) = b 0 ((w − x n−1 ) /i), lead to the following candidate solutions
and condition (17) implies w > i+1 i (7) is not symmetric anymore). In this case, condition (17) leads to w > w 0 + w i . We call x 2 n−1 the asymmetric interior solution 1. There are also the two corner solutions, 4. x n−1 = w but this can be eliminated because condition (17) leads to w i < 0,
We are going to prove that the two asymmetric interior solutions x 1 n−1 and x 2 n−1 do not exist. We first focus on x 1 n−1 . To do so, we study the second order conditions (SOC) of the maximization program (7): b 00 (x n−1 ) +
Thus, the asymmetric interior solution, if it exists is a local minimum. To eliminate the other asymmetric interior solution, we first prove an intermediate result, that is, when the benefit function is symmetric, then w i ≥ iw 0 , ∀i = 2, ..., n−1. To do so, let us compute (i − 1) b
, and
Therefore, w i ≥ iw 0 , ∀i = 2, ..., n − 1. Let us now turn to the study of x 2 n−1 . As b is symmetric,
has to be strictly greater than w 0 implying that w < (i + 1) w 0 . Moreover, condition (17), w−x 2 n−1 > w i , or equivalently iw > (i − 1) w i +2ix 0 has to be satisfied. In order these two inequalities to be compatible, we need i−1 i w i + 2w 0 < (i + 1) w 0 , that is equivalent to w i < iw 0 . This not true, therefore, the asymmetric interior solution x 2 n−1 does not exist and the optimal strategy x n−1 is either equal to w i+1 or to 0.¥
J Proof of Proposition 8
As in the symmetric case, we are going to prove this result using an induction argument.
First of all with two benefit functions, we know according to Proposition 6 that when w < w 2 , the optimal allocation is x * (w) = {w, 0} and when w ≥ w 2 , the optimal allocation is x * (w) = {w/2, w/2}. Now, we suppose that the result holds when the investor has the choice between n − 1 projects. Let us prove that it then holds when the investor has n projects. According to the previous discussion, we maximize the investor's program in two steps. First of all, we solve max
As the result holds when the investor has the choice between n−1 projects, we know how to solve this program.
and condition (18) leads to w > i+1 i (7) is not symmetric anymore). In this case, condition (18) leads to w > w 0 + w i . We call x 2 n−1 the asymmetric interior solution 1. There are also the two corner solutions, 4. x n−1 = w but this can be eliminated because condition (18) leads to w i < 0,
5. x n−1 = 0.
We are going to prove that the two asymmetric interior solutions x 
L Proof of Proposition 10
The first result is an application of Lemma 1. Concerning the other results, they are similar to the results of Proposition 3. We are going to prove the following five results:
1. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 2 to the allocation that gives the whole budget to project b, 2. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the interior solution 2, 3. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the allocation that gives the whole budget to project c, 4. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the allocation that gives the whole budget to project b, Therefore, g 0 5 (w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between the interior solution 3 to the interior solution 1, it can only be from the former to the latter.¥
